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ABSTRACT
The phenomenon of choice shifts in group decision-making has received much attention in the social
psychology literature. Faced with a choice between a “safe” and “risky” decision, group members
appear to move to one extreme or the other, relative to the choices each member might have made
on her own. Both risky and cautious shifts have been identiﬁed in different situations. This paper
demonstrates that from an individual decision-making perspective, choice shifts may be viewed as
a systematic violation of expected utility theory. We propose a model in which a well-known failure
of expected utility — captured by the Allais paradox — is equivalent to a particular conﬁguration of
choice shifts. Thus, our results imply a connection between two well-known behavioral regularities,
one in individual decision theory and another in the social psychology of groups.
Address correspondence to Kfir.Eliaz@nyu.edu, Debraj.Ray@nyu.edu, and R.Razin@lse.ac.uk. We
thank Gilat Levy for useful comments, and gratefully acknowledge support from the National Science Foun-
dation under grant number 0421852. We thank two anonymous referees and especially Douglas Bernheim for
useful comments that improved the present draft.1 Introduction
How do groups confront choices involving risk? Despite the fact that group decision-making is ubiq-
uitous in social, economic and political life, economists haven’t had much to say on the subject.1
Before 1961, conventional wisdom on the subject (largely from social psychology) was fairly unam-
biguous: relative to the attitudes of group members, the group itself is likely to favor compromise and
caution. But a series of experiments by James A. F. Stoner (1961) identiﬁed “risky shifts” : when faced
with the same decision problem, individuals within a group adopt a riskier course of action, com-
pared with the decisions they would make outside the group.2 Later, Nordhøy (1962), Stoner (1968)
and others provided some evidence for cautious shifts: a group tendency to exhibit greater restraint in
risk-taking relative to the proclivities of individuals in that group. To accommodate both directions
of change, the general phenomenon was ultimately referred to as a choice shift. Today, choice shifts in
group decision-making are universally viewed as a consistent and robust phenomenon (Davis et al.
(1992)).3
At the broadest level, group decisions embody two functions: the aggregation of information and
the aggregation of preferences. In this paper, we focus on the latter function (see below for comments
on the former). That is, assuming group members are faced with all the information relevant to the
decision at hand, we ask, can the mere fact that the ultimate decision is taken by the group as a whole
distort the individual expression of preferences? Might an individual express support or vote for an
outcome that he would not have chosen in isolation?
From the perspective of economic theory, the standard paradigm of group decision-making em-
phasizes pivotal events, special situations in which a particular individual’s “vote” affects the ﬁnal
outcome. But in such an event, the individual must act as he would in isolation, controlling for infor-
mational differences.
This argument makes it obvious that the pivotality logic is akin to an independence axiom for
decision-making, andsotosomeextentontheaxiomaticfoundationsofexpectedutility. Itistherefore
not surprising that we propose to view the phenomenon of choice shifts as a systematic violation of
expected utility theory. But more than this, we propose a model in which a well-known failure of
expected utility — captured by the Allais paradox — is equivalent to a particular conﬁguration of choice
shifts (which include both risky and cautious shifts, but in a speciﬁc pattern).
A traditional explanation for the risky shift emphasizes the “diffusion of responsibility” (DOR)
1created by a group decision (e.g., see Wallach et al. (1962, 1964)). The idea is simple: when an indi-
vidual makes a risky choice which fails to generate a successful outcome, she might feel responsible
for (or guilty about, or disappointed by) her failure. Similarly, success should bring on a sense of
“elation” over and above the “direct” utility of the outcome. DOR can be interpreted as saying that
individuals tend to place higher weight on events with low outcomes relative to events with high out-
comes, but that this tendency is attentuated when they participate in a group decision; hence, they
are willing to take greater risks within the group. Now, DOR appears to explain too much, in that it
seemingly cannot account for cautious shifts (see, e.g., Dean G. Pruitt (1971a, b)). But we are going to
argue that this assessment may have been too premature. In Theorem 1, we show that the tendency
to place higher weight on low outcomes is actually related to a family of shifts, each contingent on the
ambient group environment. Some of these shifts are cautious; some risky.
To make these points, we adopt the rank-dependent generalization of expected utility theory.
This class of preferences, originally due to John Quiggin (1982) and Menahem E. Yaari (1987), extends
the class of expected utility preferences to account for many experimental observations on decision-
making under risk (see Chris Starmer (2000)). Endowed with these preferences, an individual faces a
choice between a risky and a safe option, either alone or in a group. Say that she exhibits a risky shift
if she is indifferent between the risky and safe lotteries when making the decision herself, yet strictly
prefers to “vote” for the risky lottery in the group situation. Likewise deﬁne a cautious shift.4
We describe a group decision problem by a pair (a,b), where a ∈ (0,1) is the probability that our
individual is pivotal (i.e., decides the outcome) and b ∈ [0,1] is the probability that the group chooses
safe over risky, conditional on our individual not being pivotal.5 Theorem 1 proves that an individual
exhibits the Allais paradox if and only if he exhibits the following pattern of choice shifts: for every
likelihood a of being pivotal, there exists a unique threshold b∗ — the likelihood of the safe outcome
in the non-pivotal case — such that our individual exhibits a risky shift when b < b∗, and a cautious
shift when b > b∗. This result establishes an intimate connection between two well-known behavioral
regularities, one in individual decision theory and another in the social psychology of groups.6
While we take a ﬁrst step towards a formal theory of choice shifts, our emphasis on a “pure”
preference-based theory is admittedly special. In particular, it is not meant to signal that an informa-
tional approach to choice shifts is any less important, just that the two are potentially complementary.
Indeed, economic theory does offer a set of models that produce a shift in an individual’s vote, be-
cause the votes of others may embody information that a particular individual may not possess (see
2Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)). Now, this particular route is of interest but it does necessitate
that information not be revealed explicitly, requiring it to be indirectly transmitted through the ﬁnal
decision-making process instead. For a large class of situations, and particularly in group situations
with a commonality of objectives, we do not ﬁnd this argument very convincing.7 On the other hand,
this is not to deny that group members bring new information to the table. They certainly do, ranging
all the way from the provision of veriﬁable facts to different ways of reasoning about commonly avail-
able data.8 And it is certainly possible that such group interaction may lead to signiﬁcant changes in
the behavior or attitudes of each member. Whether these interactions are capable of generating pre-
dictable shifts in attitudes towards risk and caution is a different matter that we do not address here.9
Thus our focus is a more primitive one: we study the basic logic of individual decision-making in
group situations.
Further discussion follows the statement of the theorem, and potential applications are described
in Section 3. The formal proof of the theorem is relegated to an appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Preferences
Let P denote the set of simple lotteries (i.e., lotteries with ﬁnite outcomes) over some ambient con-
nected space of outcomes. The individual in question is presumed to have rank-dependent preferences
(RDP) deﬁned on P. Such preferences are represented by a functional called a rank-dependent utility,
which is similar to expected utility except that it is not linear in the probabilities.
To describe the representation, ﬁx some preference ordering . Order the support outcomes of
any simple lottery — call them 1,...,n — in weakly increasing order of preference. The lottery is
then p = (p1,...,pn). For k = 1,...,n + 1, let wk(p) be the sum of all probability weights over
outcomes that are worse than k; wk(p) =
P
i<k pi. Of course, w1(p) is always 0.
Well-known axiomatizations10 assert that  is an RDP ordering if and only if there exists a con-
tinuous, strictly increasing “probability transformation function” f : [0,1] → [0,1] with f(0) = 0 and
f(1) = 1 and a continuous, nondegenerate utility function u deﬁned on outcomes11 such that p  q
if and only if
n X
k=1
[f(wk+1(p)) − f(wk(p))]u(k) ≥
n X
k=1
[f(wk+1(q)) − f(wk(q))]u(k). (1)
3In what follows, we employ the minor additional restriction that f is differentiable.
2.2 The Allais Paradox
As mentioned in the Introduction, the RDP class was introduced in response to a large body of evi-
dence indicating a violation of the independence axiom. Perhaps the best known violation is the Al-
lais Paradox, ﬁrst discovered by Maurice Allais (1953). To describe Allais’ original paradox consider
the ordered set of outcomes {0,1M,5M} (M is one hundred million francs in Allais’ 1953 formula-
tion). Let p,q,p0 and q0 be the following lotteries,
p = ( 89
100, 11
100, 0








Allais found that for most subjects, q  p but p0  q0.
Notice that in the paradox, we “transform” p to p0 by moving weight (equal to 89/100 in the
speciﬁc example) from the low outcome to the middle outcome. Exactly the same shift of weight is
applied to “transform” q to q0. One may view the Allais paradox as stating that such common shifts of
weight raise the preference for p over q. Here is a formal deﬁnition based on that idea: an individual
exhibits the Allais Paradox if for every pair of lotteries (1 − α,α,0) and (1 − β,0,β) with α > β and
(1 − α,α,0) v (1 − β,0,β), we have
(1 − α − γ,α + γ,0)  (1 − β − γ,γ,β)
for all γ ∈ (0,1 − α].
This deﬁnition turns out to be a special case of a more extensive class of situations that Segal (1987)
refers to as the “generalized” Allais paradox (for variants of the Allais paradox, see the survey by
Starmer (2000)). We return brieﬂy to a discussion of our deﬁnition in the remarks following Theorem
1.
2.3 Choice Shifts
Now we develop the notion of choice shifts. As in the case of the Allais paradox, we are interested in
choices over a risky lottery r and a safe lottery s. However, owing to the nature of group interaction,
the individual must confront more complex (compound) lotteries.
4Speciﬁcally, group decision-making introduces strategic uncertainty. An individual will generally
cast her vote or express an opinion on the choice to be made between r and s,12 while often remaining
uncertain of the ﬁnal outcome. In its most abstract and general form, a group decision problem (from
the point of view of a given individual) may be represented by a pair g ≡ (a,b), where a ∈ (0,1) is the
probabilitythatourindividualispivotal(i.e., decidestheoutcome)andb ∈ [0,1]istheprobabilitywith
which the group decides on s, conditional on our individual not being pivotal. The great advantage
of this description is, of course, that it admits a large class of aggregation rules within the group. [A
possible disadvantage is that a and b don’t simply depend on the nature of the group problem but on
the behavior of other group members, an “equilibrium issue” which we don’t address.] Note that the
restriction a > 0 means that our individual must have some say within the group, and the restriction
a < 1 means that she cannot be a dictator.
We will say that an individual exhibits a risky shift over r and s within the group problem g if she
is indifferent between r and s, yet strictly prefers to “vote” for r in the context of that group problem.
Likewise, she exhibits a cautious shift over r and s (within the group problem g) if she is indifferent
between r and s, yet strictly prefers to “vote” for s in the context of that group problem. A shift —
risky or cautious — is generally referred to as a choice shift.
To see this more formally, construct the “effective lotteries” when the individual participates in
a group decision with parameters (a,b). Let p and q be a pair of simple lotteries and let x be some
value in [0,1]. We denote by x[p] + (1 − x)[q] the compound lottery that yields the lottery p with
probability x and the lottery q with probability 1 − x. Thus, if a group member “votes” for r, the
effective compound lottery r∗ is given by
r∗ ≡ a[r] + (1 − a)[b[s] + (1 − b)[r]]. (2)
Likewise, when she votes for s, the compound lottery thus generated is
s∗ ≡ a[s] + (1 − a)[b[s] + (1 − b)[r]]. (3)
A risky shift is the joint statement r ∼ s and r∗  s∗, while a cautious shift is the joint statement r ∼ s
and s∗  r∗. A choice shift is just the lack of indifference between r∗ and s∗, assuming that there is
indifference between r and s to begin with.
Notice that our formulation of the choice shift phenomenon has nothing to do with attitudes to
risk. For instance, if b = 0 then r=r∗ and r∗ = a[s]+(1−a)[r]. Hence, r ∼ s must imply r∗ ∼ s∗ under
5expected utility theory (or even under the weaker assumption of betweeness), regardless of attitudes
to risk.
2.4 The Main Result
We are now in a position to state our equivalence result.
Theorem 1 In the rank-dependent class, the following statements are equivalent:
1. An individual exhibits the Allais Paradox.
2. Given any pair r and s and any a ∈ (0,1), there exists b∗ ∈ [0,1] such that for any group decision problem
g = (a,b) with b < b∗, she prefers to support the risky option, while if b > b∗, she prefers to support the safe
option. Moreover, if the agent is initially indifferent between r and s, then b∗ lies strictly between 0 and 1. The
individual exhibits a risky shift if b < b∗, and a cautious shift if b > b∗.
The theorem shows that the phenomenon of choice shifts may be viewed as a preference reversal
that is caused by the same failure of independence that triggers the Allais paradox.
In the formal proof, we show that both the Allais paradox and the phenomenon of choice shifts are
separatelyequivalenttothestrictconcavityofthetransformationfunctionf.13 Weusethisconnection
here to provide some intuition for the theorem.
Suppose that a risky lottery r places probability p on winning a high prize and probability 1−p on
winning a low prize. Suppose that s is a safe lottery that promises some prize intermediate between
the ﬁrst two. Imagine “transforming” s into r by removing probability mass from the intermediate
prize and transferring it in the ratio p : 1 − p to the high and low prizes. The two transfers create
a tradeoff, and an individual’s preferences across r and s may be viewed as an evaluation of this
tradeoff.14
In a group decision problem our individual generates a choice between the “derived” lotteries
r∗ (by voting risky) and s∗ (by voting safe). The tradeoff between these two lotteries is exactly the
same as it was before: to “transform” s∗ into r∗, remove probability mass from the intermediate prize
and transfer it in the ratio p : 1 − p to the high and low prizes. However, when f is nonlinear,
an individual views the same marginal tradeoffs differently, depending on the “initial lottery” (for
instance, the lotteries s and s∗ in our discussion). In particular, the probability with which the low
prize is realized in this “initial lottery” becomes important.
6If f is strictly concave and the initial low-prize probability is small to start with, the transfer of
mass to the low outcome is likely to have a large (negative) impact on utility. It follows that in this
case, the individual is less likely to “accept” the implied tradeoff; he will vote for the safe outcome.
Now, the probability of the “initial” low outcome being small is linked closely to the safe outcome
being adopted with high probability when our agent votes safe. Because b is the probability that the
safe outcome will emerge when our agent is not decisive, all this is connected with b being high. To
summarize: high b assists an individual’s preference for caution in a group problem.
By exactly the same logic, a low b increases the chances of r being adopted even when our agent
votessafe, sothattheprobabilityofthelowoutcomeunders∗ istherebyincreased. Bystrictconcavity,
the same probability transfer has a smaller negative impact, raising the chances of voting risky. This
explains, or at least indicates, how the strict concavity of f can be related to a class of choice shifts as
described in part (2) of the theorem.
The strict concavity of f also implies the Allais paradox. Recall that we start with two lotteries
(1 − α,α,0) and (1 − β,0,β) over which the individual is indifferent. The only way this can happen
is if α exceeds β to begin with, or equivalently, if the probability of the low outcome in the former
lottery is smaller than in the latter. But now a probability transfer of γ from the low outcome to the
middle outcome will have a stronger positive impact in the former lottery, resulting in the comparison
(1 − α − γ,α + γ,0)  (1 − β − γ,γ,β). This is precisely our condition.
We have therefore linked a fairly complex pattern of choice shifts to the Allais paradox using the
“intermediate” device of a strictly concave transformation function. Several steps are missing, of
course. We need to show that a strictly concave f is not just a convenient link, it is a necessary link. In
addition, our predicted pattern of choice shifts is valid for all risky lotteries, not just those that take
on two outcomes.
The reader interested in the complete argument is therefore invited to study the formal proof. The
proof actually indicates that the Allais paradox can be stated in even weaker form without losing the
equivalence of the theorem: one need only impose the paradox for “small” shifts of probability from
the low to the middle outcome. However, the original version of the Allais paradox refers to another
special case: one in which all the weight is removed from the low outcome for one of the lotteries
(recall the example in Section 2.2). This case is implied by the strict concavity of the transformation
function f, but the reverse implication does not generally hold. One can easily amend the proof here
to show that if the coexistence of strictly concave and strictly convex segments in f can be ruled out by
7some other condition, our predicted pattern of the choice shifts is equivalent to the original, restricted
form of the Allais paradox.15
3 Discussion
By Theorem 1, any individual who exhibits the Allais paradox exhibits choice shifts, but does so in a
particular, testable pattern. As an instance of this pattern, consider the case of unanimity, and suppose
that in the absence of unanimous agreement the fallback option is the risky outcome. It is very easy
to see that b = 0 for this case, so by Theorem 1, a risky shift will occur.
On the other hand, suppose that a unanimity vote is required to replace a sure status-quo with a
risky alternative. Then b = 1. Theorem 1 states that a cautious shift will occur.16
The above prediction can be applied in a variety of situations. For instance, empirical evidence
shows that 75% of U.S. households do not hold stocks despite the high equity premium (see Michael
Haliassos and Carol Bertaut (1995)): another manifestation of the well known equity premium puz-
zle. To understand this bias towards relative safety, it may help to view a household as a two-person
group that requires unanimity to make risky investments. In the absence of unanimous agreement,
say that some safe strategy is adopted — a savings account or a CD. Then b is effectively 1, and so our
model predicts that whenever the spouse is almost indifferent between risky and safe investing, [s]he
would tend to decide against the risky option. Thus households would exhibit a bias towards rela-
tively safe investment opportunities, accepting risky investments only when these offer a relatively
high premium.17
Indeed, the reasoning behind our explanation yields a corollary: controlling for wealth and other
factors, households with two or more members will tend to make more cautious investments com-
pared to the investments made by unitary households. We know of no data that conﬁrm or deny this
assertion, but it is certainly testable.
More generally, our argument brings together two strands of literature on household behavior:
one that models households as collective decision units (see Francois Bourguignon and Pierre-Andr´ e
Chiappori (1992) and Maurizio Mazzocco (2004)), and another that attempts to explain the equity-
premiumpuzzlewithrank-dependentpreferences(butremainswithintherepresentativeagentparadigm).18
Our particular emphasis of the effect of the Allais paradox on group decision-making opens up a new
and possibly signiﬁcant connection. If indeed, as the experimental literature (see, e.g., Colin Camerer
8(1995)) has shown, most people are prone to Allais-type behavior, then we should not be “puzzled”
by large equity premia. In short, under our approach, the equity premium is a puzzle only so far as
Allais behavior is considered a paradox.
What determines the likely outcome (such as safety in the example above) in case a particular
individual isn’t pivotal? In many situations, social convention might drive such an outcome. For
example, in a football team, huddled in the ﬁnal seconds of a close game, players would expect a
risky play (b ' 0), and such an expectation might itself cause a risky shift for each player.19 Or
consider a team of physicians that debates the use of a new experimental drug (successful in some
past cases but leading to complications in others) versus a conventional option (which, say, alleviates
the pain but does not cure the illness). The belief of doctors about their peers opinions (and hence the
parameter b) may depend on the situation of the patient or the usual practices in their hospital.
In these examples and in many similar situations, one course of action is usually considered the
socialnorm: inonesituationthenormmaycallforrisk-taking, whileinanotherthenormmayinvolve
caution. Typically, a supermajority (perhaps full consensus) will be required to overturn the norm.
Indeed, some of the pioneering studies on choice shifts focused on decision problems of this type (for
a survey of these studies see Pruitt (1971a,b)). The basic ﬁnding in these studies is that for items on
which the widely held values favor the risky alternative, unanimous group decisions are more risky
than the average of the initial individual decisions. Group decisions tend to be more cautious on
items for which widely held values favor the cautious alternative.
In group decisions in which no overt social or cultural values are at stake (e.g. a decision between
investment opportunities, job candidates), it is often the case that an option serves as a focal point
whenever it is believed to be supported by the majority. In such cases, our model predicts that shifts
would occur in the direction of the “focal” option. This prediction is consistent with experimental
studies that demonstrate choice shifts using lotteries with monetary prizes. In particular, Davis and
Hintz (1982) provides a survey of experimental evidence demonstrating that in binary decision prob-
lems, the direction of choice shifts in groups is largely predicted by the preferences of the majority of
individuals.
Shifts towards the majority option have been reported in a series of recent studies by Cass R.
Sunstein and his collaborators on mock juries (see David Schkade, Sunstein and Daniel Kahneman
(2001) and Sunstein, Reid Hastie, John W. Payne and Schkade (2002). These studies have shown that
“when a majority of individuals initially favored little punishment, the jury’s verdict showed a ‘le-
9niency shift’, meaning a verdict that was systematically lowered than the median rating of individual
members before they started to talk with one another. But when the majority of individual jurors
favored strong punishment, the group as a whole produced a ‘severity shift’, meaning a rating that
was systematically higher than the median rating of individual members before they started to talk”
(Sunstein (2004)).20
Systematic biases in judicial decisions have also been found in comparing the decision of fed-
eral judges in isolation and in panels of three.21 Sunstein (2004) reports that the vote of a demo-
cratic/republican judge is inﬂuenced by the conﬁguration of the other judges in the panel. On a
given issue, judges deciding on their own would tend to vote according to their “political afﬁliation”,
but when facing a related decision in a panel containing a majority of judges from the opposing party,
they tend to shift their decision in the other direction.
Investment clubs may also be thought of as an example in which group members exhibit a choice
shift towards a focal option, one which is believed to be supported by the majority of members. An
estimated 11% of the US population is involved in an investment club (Brooke Harrington (2001)).
Approximately 60% of investment club members are women (Harrington (2001)), which contrasts
sharply with the percentage of women who invest in the stock market on their own (Brad M. Barber
and Terrance Odean (2001)). In addition, Barber and Odean (2001) present empirical evidence that
suggests that women are far less conﬁdent than men are with regard to taking risk on the stock
market.22 These ﬁndings suggests that women, while unwilling to invest in stocks on their own,
accept the risk of these investments when deciding in a group with other women. This may be
explained by noting that since the women meet as an “investment club”, each expects some risky
investment to be made, hence each would lessen the weight she puts on bad outcomes and be more
willing to accept risk.23
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we focused on choice shifts from the perspective of an individual decision-maker. A
natural sequel would be to conduct an equilibrium analysis of choice shifts. One way to proceed in
this direction is to introduce a distribution of preference types, such that all types are disappointment
averse and at least one type is indifferent between the risky and safe lotteries. We could then derive
the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria of games induced by different supermajority rules. Theorem
101 implies that under unanimity there would exist a unique equilibrium in undominated strategies
in which the status-quo is implemented. This is because unanimity has the special feature that the
outcome in a non-pivotal event is independent of the players’ beliefs. However, this feature is not
shared by other supermajority rules, which suggests that such rules may induce multiple equilibrium
outcomes.
Our paper suggests a parsimonious explanation for why group members may base their decisions
on non-pivotal events. An important conclusion that comes out of this is that systematic shifts that
individuals exhibit when participating in group decisions may simply be another manifestation of
the well-known Allais paradox. Hence, such shifts are to be viewed as anomalous only in as much as
the Allais “paradox” is thought of as truly paradoxical.
5 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Let p and p0 be two lotteries. Denote the union of their supports by {1,...,n}. In
what follows we assume without loss of generality that outcome k+1 is strictly preferred to outcome
k. Let {wk} and {w0
k} be the associated collection of worse-than weights. Then, if ∆ denotes the utility
















where Tk ≡ f(wk) − f(w0





where c(k) ≡ u(k − 1) − u(k) < 0 for all 2 ≤ k ≤ n.
We proceed in two steps.
STEP 1. The Allais paradox holds if and only if f is strictly concave.
Suppose that f is strictly concave. Let p = (1 − α − γ,α + γ,0) and p0 = (1 − β − γ,γ,β). (4)
implies that
∆ = c(2)[f(1 − α − γ) − f(1 − β − γ)] + c(3)[1 − f(1 − β)]. (5)
11When γ = 0, it is assumed that p ∼ p0, so that
c(2)[f(1 − α) − f(1 − β)] + c(3)[1 − f(1 − β)] = 0 (6)
Using (6) in (5), we see that
∆
−c(2)
= [f(1 − β − γ) − f(1 − α − γ)] + [f(1 − α) − f(1 − β)]
= [f(1 − α) − f(1 − α − γ)] − [f(1 − β) − f(1 − β − γ)], (7)
and the right-hand side of this expression is positive by strict concavity of f. Consequently, the Allais
paradox holds.
Conversely, assume the Allais paradox. To prove that f is strictly concave, it sufﬁces to show that
there exists  > 0 such that for every x and y in (0,1) with 0 < y − x < ,
f(x) − f(x − γ) > f(y) − f(y − γ) (8)
for all γ ∈ (0,x]. To this end, pick any three outcomes that are strictly ranked (nondegeneracy of u
— see footnote 11 — permits this). Clearly, there exists  > 0 such that if x and y are in (0,1) and
0 < y − x < 
(y,0,1 − y)  (x,1 − x,0).
Using the connectedness of the outcome space, however, we can shift the best of the three outcomes
close enough to the intermediate outcome such that
(y,0,1 − y) ∼ (x,1 − x,0).
Now (with α = 1 − x and β = 1 − y) all the conditions of the Allais paradox are satisﬁed, so that we
can follow the same argument leading to (7) to assert that for all γ ∈ (0,x], (8) holds.
STEP 2. Part 2 of the theorem holds if and only if f is strictly concave.
Assume f is strictly concave. Fix a pair (r,s) and a probability of being pivotal a. The decision
problem our individual faces in a group decision g = (a,b) is a choice between the two compound
lotteries r∗ and s∗, which are deﬁned formally in (2) and (3).
The “worse-than” weights of the two compound lotteries are, of course, functions of the group
decision parameter g, so write them as wk(r∗,g) and wk(s∗,g). To economize on notation, however,
let Rk(g) ≡ wk(r∗,g) and Sk(g) ≡ wk(s∗,g) for every k, with the understanding that we will simply
12write Rk and Sk when the context is clear. Similarly, let wk ≡ wk(r) for every outcome k. Without loss
of generality r places positive weight on outcomes 1 and n, so that
0 < wk < 1 for every 2 ≤ k ≤ n. (9)
It is easy to see that
Rk = Rk(g) = [a + (1 − a)(1 − b)]wk for k ≤ s
= [a + (1 − a)(1 − b)]wk + b(1 − a) for k > s, (10)
while
Sk = Sk(g) = (1 − a)(1 − b)wk for k ≤ s
= (1 − a)(1 − b)wk + [a + b(1 − a)] for k > s. (11)
Let V (r∗,g) and V (s∗,g) be the expected payoffs from voting r and from voting s in the group





where Tk ≡ f(Rk) − f(Sk) for each k. In fact, if we deﬁne λ ≡ (1 − a)(1 − b),
Tk = f([a + λ]wk) − f(λwk) for k ≤ s, (13)
and
Tk = f([a + λ]wk + [1 − a − λ]) − f(λwk + [1 − λ]) for k > s. (14)







[f(λwk +[1−λ])−f([a+λ]wk +[1−a−λ])]c(k). (15)
Recalling (9), the observation that f(x + y) − f(x) is declining in x when f is strictly concave and
y > 0, and the fact that c(k) < 0, simple inspection of (15) reveals that ∆(g) is strictly increasing in λ
for given a.24 Because λ and b are negatively related, this proves that ∆(g) is strictly decreasing in b,
which establishes the ﬁrst statement in part 2.
To establish the remainder of part 2, notice that a = 1 (and λ = 0) is equivalent to the individual






[1 − f(wk)]c(k) = 0. (16)




∆(g) > 0 and lim
b→1
∆(g) < 0. (17)
To do this, note that ∆(g) is continuous so simply put b = 0 (λ = 1 − a) and then b = 1 (λ = 0) in




[f(wk) − f([1 − a]wk)]c(k) −
n X
k=s+1
[f([1 − a]wk + a) − f(wk)]c(k). (18)
Now by strict concavity, f([1−a]wk+a) > (1−a)f(wk)+af(1) = (1−a)f(wk)+a, and f([1−a]wk) >




[f(wk) − (1 − a)f(wk)]c(k) −
n X
k=s+1


















[1 − f([awk + [1 − a])]c(k). (19)



















using (16) once again. This completes the proof of part 2, given part 1.
It remains to show that part 2 of Theorem 1 implies that f is strictly concave.
Denote by x a typical low outcome, by s a safe outcome and by y a typical high outcome, with
u(x) < u(s) < u(y). Let r denote a typical risky lottery that places probability p on x and 1 − p on y.
Then for group parameters g = (a,b),
∆(g) = [f((a + λ)p) − f(λp)]c(s) + [f((a + λ)p + (1 − a − λ)) − f(λp + (1 − λ))]c(y),
where c(s) ≡ u(x) − u(s), and c(y) ≡ u(s) − u(y).
14Now suppose that there is an open interval I such that f0(z) is nondecreasing on I. Find parame-
ters ˆ g = (ˆ a,ˆ b) and a risky weight ˆ p such that
[ˆ λˆ p, ˆ λˆ p + (1 − ˆ λ)] ⊆ I. (20)
where ˆ λ, just as before, is (1−ˆ a)(1−ˆ b). This is very easy to do. As a consequence, all the four numbers
ˆ λˆ p, (ˆ a + ˆ λ)ˆ p, (ˆ a + ˆ λ)ˆ p + (1 − ˆ a − ˆ λ) and ˆ λˆ p + (1 − ˆ λ)
lie in I as well.
At the same time, choose the supports x, y and s so that c(s) and c(y) satisfy the equation
∆(g) = [f((ˆ a + ˆ λ)ˆ p) − f(ˆ λˆ p)]c(s) + [f((ˆ a + ˆ λ)ˆ p + (1 − ˆ a − ˆ λ)) − f(ˆ λˆ p + (1 − ˆ λ))]c(y) = 0. (21)
Now differentiate ∆(g) with respect to b in a small interval around ˆ b (keeping all other parameters
constant). Letting λ = (1 − ˆ a)(1 − b), we see that that
−
1
1 − ˆ a
∂∆(g)
∂b
= ˆ p[f0((ˆ a+λ)ˆ p)−f0(λˆ p)]c(s)−(1− ˆ p)[f0((ˆ a+λ)ˆ p+(1−ˆ a−λ))−f0(λˆ p+(1−λ))]c(y).
But for all such b (in a small enough interval containing ˆ b) (20) holds. Therefore f0((ˆ a+λ)ˆ p) ≥ f0(λˆ p)
and f0((ˆ a + λ)ˆ p + (1 − ˆ a − λ)) ≤ f0(λˆ p + (1 − λ)). Using this in the expression above along with the
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Footnotes
1. A notable exception is a recent experimental literature that compares the quality of decision
making across groups and individuals (e.g., David J. Cooper and John H. Kagel (2004)).
2. Stoner’s study was based on a questionnaire with 12 hypothetical “life situations”, which were
originally designed by Michael A. Wallach and Nathan Kogan (1959, 1961) to investigate indi-
vidual risk-taking propensities.
3. Shifts have also been found in studies using choices between lotteries with monetary prizes —
see Davis and Hintz (1982) and the references therein.
4. More generally, the literature on non-expected utility has focussed on two sorts of preferences:
the Yaari-Quiggin class and the class of “betweenness-satisfying” preferences. The latter has
preferences in which a mixture between two lotteries is ranked “in between” those lotteries.
To motivate our focus on RDP we note that even the weakest version of betweenness, mixture
18symmetry (proposed by Soo-Hong Chew, Larry G. Epstein and Uzi Segal (1991)), cannot accom-
modate choice shifts. For under mixture symmetry, an individual who is indifferent between
some pair of lotteries, is also indifferent between each of these lotteries and any mixture of both.
5. Observe that this description is compatible with a large class of aggregation rules within the
group. Also note that in an extended framework, a and b are endogenously determined by the
“equilibrium” behavior of all group members.
6. An exercise in a similar spirit may be found in Daisuke Nakajima (2004), which connects the
Allais paradox to experimental ﬁndings that the Dutch auction raises more revenue than a ﬁrst-
price sealed-bid auction.
7. Indeed, in most of the experiments, and in many of the examples we discuss in Section 3, group
members arrived at a decision after the relevant information was either presented by an outside
party or revealed during deliberation.
8. For a formal model of the latter type of interaction, see Enriqueta Aragones, Itzhak Gilboa,
Andrew Postlewaite and David Schmeidler (2005).
9. When preparing the ﬁnal draft of this paper, Doug Bernheim drew our attention to Joel Sobel
(2005), which takes up this line of reasoning.
10. There have been many axiomatic derivations of rank-dependent utility. Restrictions of space
prevent us from doing justice to all the contributors to this line of research. The most recent
and most general axiomatization is offered by Mohammed Abdellaoui (2002). References to
previous studies can be found in this paper.
11. Nondegeneracy simply means that utility values are distinct over at least two outcomes, and
therefore — by the continuity of u and connectedness of the outcome space — over a continuum
of them.
12. Note that individuals don’t necessarily vote within the group problem. Depending on the con-
text, one may be modelling votes, advice, command or suggestion.
13. The equivalence between the Allais paradox and strict concavity of f was proved by Segal
(1987). While we work with a weaker version of the Allais paradox, we do not emphasize this
19particular connection as a novel feature of the paper. On the other hand, the equivalence with
choice shifts is at the heart of our exercise. In passing, it is worth noting that the strict concavity
of f has been linked to other facets of individual behavior. Abdellaoui (2002) and Yaari (1987)
connect concave f to a notion of risk-aversion, appropriately deﬁned for the RDP class. Peter
P. Wakker (2001, 2005) links the concavity of f to a failure of the sure-thing principle, which he
calls “pessimism”.
14. The idea of a “revealed probability trade-off” was introduced in Abdellaoui (2002).
15. For instance, a further axiomatization of RDP is provided by Simon Grant and Atsushi Kajii
(1998), which results in a transformation function that has constant elasticity. Constant elasticity
precludes the coexistence of strictly convex and strictly concave segments.
16. Of course, unanimity represents a special case in which the nonpivotal event is uniquely pinned
down by some default. In other group settings, an individual’s expectation regarding the non-
pivotal event may depend on her beliefs about the other members in the group (and so captured
best by “interior” values of b).
17. To be sure, a fully developed application of our model would require us to explain why an
individual household member faces a parameter such as a: some probability between 0 and
1 that she may be pivotal. One interpretation — the one that ﬁts most easily into our model
— is that there some uncertainty about what the partner(s) of that member will decide to do.
This seems reasonable: while there is presumably a process of deliberation in which all the pros
and cons are discussed, each member may still be uncertain as to the effect of her opinion on
the ﬁnal investment decision. It is also possible to view the situation as one in which a spouse
becomes reluctant to pressure his/her partner into a risky investment, if there is uncertainty
regarding what that partner would do if called on to decide unilaterally. By supporting the safe
status quo, the spouse avoids the possibility of feeling responsible for unfavorable results.
18. See Narayana R. Kocherlakota (1996) for a survey.
19. Wallach, Kogan and Daryl J. Bem (1962) use this decision problem as an example of a group
decision in which the risky option is considered to be the social norm.
20. In our opinion, the systematic shifts uncovered by Sunstein and others cannot be explained by
the information-driven biases of the various jury theorems in the political economy literature.
20Jurors approach the trial with no prior private information, they all observe the same evidence
and arguments during the trial, and any asymmetry in the interpretation of this information
will most likely wash out in the deliberation process.
21. These studies have focused on cases in which judges were confronted with the decision to “up-
hold an administrative agency’s interpretation of law, so long as those interpretations do not
violate clear congressional instructions and so long as those interpretations are ‘reasonable’ ”
(Sunstein (2004)). One may view the decision to uphold the agency’s interpretation as the safe
alternative, while offering a different interpretation may be reasonably viewed as a riskier al-
ternative.
22. Noticing that women are reluctant to invest in the stock-market on their own, some commercial
banks in Israel have began organizing investment clubs where women meet to discuss potential
investments; see Noa Greenberg (2001).
23. Another interpretation of the what happens in investment clubs is that they allow individuals
to aggregate information and share the burden of conducting research. However, this may not
be a compelling answer. Most investment clubs tend to be composed of individuals who do not
have prior expertise in investing. They also tend to be composed of homogeneous populations.
Moreover, there other standard alternatives that are available to individual investors who do
not have the time or expertise to invest in ﬁnancial research, such as actively managed mutual
funds. Indeed, recent studies have shown that investment clubs underperform relative to indi-
vidual investors drawn from the same population (Barber and Odean (2000)). This seems to run
counter to the intuition that investment clubs aggregate information, or at least that they do so
effectively.
24. For 2 ≤ k ≤ s, identify x with λwk and y with awk. For s + 1 ≤ k ≤ n, identify x with
(a + λ)wk + (1 − a − λ) and y with a(1 − wk), but note in this latter case that x decreases as λ
increases.
21